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One tnost conspicuous and substantial process in the new historical 
pcriofi beginning ;t,t t])e end of World War 11 was tiie disintegration of 
traditional colonial empires, the cessation of formally expressed relations 
of protectorate-colonial subordination. Old states, buried in oblivion, 
were reborn, new, so far non-existing ones emerged, and all these comprise 
a considerable proportion of the world's territory and population. Peoples 
having become independent recently represent in many a respect au to­
nomous forces which can no longer be left out of consideration, i t  is one 
[trimary task of modern history to study the laws governing the movement 
of this factor which in all probability will increasingly affect the progress 
of entire mankind.
There have been, and still exist, immense differences between coun- 
tries-belonging to the one-time colonial and semi-colonial category — in 
respect of their level of economic, social and political development, their 
role in world economy, the population number, and the degree of de­
pendence; yet in some fields — decisive exactly in respect of international 
relations — we see a domination of identities and similarities. The con­
ditions of political and economic dependence on alien powers, and the 
aspirations aimed at, or resulting in, the liquidation of such dependence 
belong here first of alt. The following is an a ttem pt a t studying the di- 
rcctlv acting*, omnipresent and principal components of the process 
leading to independence. Which are, in given circumstances, these com­
ponents? On the one side is colonialism and its manifestation: decoloni­
sation: on the other side is anticolonialism and its manifestation: national 
liberation movements. The subject of this study is the presentation of 
nearly two decades tha t preceded the independence of an African count­
ry, Kenya.
Why did the choice fall on Kenya? Because in this Hast African 
country the charactcrisitic features of former colonial (mostly African)
* O th e r  fa c to rs  a re  a lso in v o lv ed  h e re  in d ire c tly , a n d  d ec is iv e ly  a s  co n ce rn s  th e  
h is to r ic a l p rocess as a  w hole, sn ch  a s  th e  g ro w in g  in flu en ce  of th e  so c ia lis t c a m p , th e  r iv a lry  
b e tw een  lead in g  c a p ita lis  p o w erst, e tc .
territories took shape in a concentrated form and at Die same [dace. 
Because the British coioniai doctrine of indirect rule, the conspicuous 
identities of the ethnic and class structure of society, the particular role 
of the white settlers and the immigrants from India, the social stratifi­
cation and the tribal lingual diversity of the Africans, the armed and 
parliamentary way of the liberation movement, as well as a lew other 
sets of im portant problems can be studied here in their well-developed 
form and correlations. But what wo wanted to ascertain first of all 
was this: what was the role of the two forces, in the process leading to 
independence, i.e. of decolonization and the national liberation movement, 
and what relationship existed between them.
The economic and class conditions ot Kenya from World War !) to the
attainment of independence
The rate of industrial and agricultural production was accelerated 
after the war. The pre-war production value of agriculture was sur­
passed by about 40% between 1953 and 1958. The monocultural pattern 
increased, and this growth — like everywhere in Trans-Saharan Africa — 
resulted almost without exception in an increase of export produce, 
while food production decreased in many cases.' This process was parti­
cularly drastic in K enya's reserves, where the conditions of cultivation 
of the underfed African population were heavily deteriorated- while 90 
per cent of the big plantations were left uncultivated.' Foreign trade 
assumed a determining role in the realization of the national income. 
As concerns the correlation between the national income and the volume 
of foreign trade, the following statistics are available: a t the end of the 
50's, the per capita national income in Hast Africa was 65 dollars (US), 
per capita exports amounted to 21, imports to 20 dollars.* The cconomic 
importance of the planters resulted exactly from the fact tha t 70 per 
cent of the exports were of agricultural nature, and tha t agricultural 
produce was provided first of all by them.s
The principal products were, and still arc, coffee, sisal, cereals, 
tobacco, alcoholic beverages, sugar cane and cotton. According to data 
from 1956, coffee, tea and sisal accounted for more than 63% of Kenya's 
total export value, within which coffee alone amounted to 47.1%."
in  K enya's backward economic life, based one-sidedly on agricultur­
al exports, room was only left for the processing industry which — mainlv 
as a manifestation of the settlers' interest — underwent considerable 
development, and its share in the national income amounted to 13.5% 
in 1937. This is more than three times the figure in neighbouring Tanga­
nyika und Uganda, and is one index of K enya's special position in Hast 
Africa.
The ma jority of the Africans, amounting to 96% of the entire popu­
lation. were tillers of the soil and lived mainly in the rather restricted 
reserves.
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]n 1897 the cut ire territory of Kenya was declared property of t he 
British crown, and the rohhery of land, i.e. the sellout at ridiculously low 
prices of land forming the "property of the crown", was started  at th a t 
time. In 1921 the British High Court of Justice took a definite principled 
stand in the land question of Kenya and, making reference to the "Crown 
Land Ordinance" of 1915 and the colonial status of Kenya which came 
into force in 1929, declared th a t "the natives are tenants a t will of the 
Crown on the land actually occupied."'' The tendency to form gigantic 
estates was supported officially. A special permit was required only for 
purchases over 100 acres (400 hectares).
Parallel with the organization of the colonial adm inistration in 
K enya (the "stabilization"), the inflow of Huropean settlers grew. While 
in the years immediately following World War I their number was less 
than six thousand, this figure was doubled by 1926. And in 1938 nearly 
twenty thousand fanners and owners of big estates lived in the most 
fertile White Highland.
The economic power of the settlers was based on their immense 
lands. The entire colonial history of K enya is centred round the land pro­
blem. The appropriation of land, involving the deprival of land, proceed­
ed by leaps and bounds as is shown by the figures below:**





These appropriation data relate solely to the White Highland, bu t 
4/5 of the country's population live here.
The development process of the big plantation farms was very rapid, 
and reflected at the same time the rate of land robbery. The fust mammoth 
estate developed in 1903 in Kikuyuland near Nairobi. The most im portant 
of these big estates were owned by the monopoly companies "Mast African 
Sisal Kstates", "Mast African Sisal Plantations", "Kilifi Plantations" and 
"Consolidated Sisal Kstates of Mast Africa."
I t was a characteristic contrast th a t while the Huropean immigrants 
left 90 p.c. of their excellent lands uncultivated, the herds of the Africans 
perished in the immediate vicinity of em pty territories declared "pro­
tected". The population density in reserves with cultivable land was 
extremely high, in the Baluhia, and in some Kikuyu reserves, the 
population per square kilometre was six hundred, even thousand."
The marking out of reserves was started very soon. A decision was 
passed in 1904 for creating this institution which reduced the Africans 
to the status of second-class citizens in their own country. Otherwise 
the lands of these reserves were also managed as the property of the 
British crown and the Africans occupying them were only granted a lease.
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The minitower rctjuironcnt of the Huropcan farms, tnainly of the 
big plantations, was met not only by large-scale iand robbcrv, bu t also 
by taxation. The governor Sir Percy Girouard stated several times in the 
early 1900's th a t taxation is the only efficient means for forcing the na­
tives to abandon their reserves and to look for a job.'"
No official statistics were collected, and could not be collected, be­
cause the planters paid different wages in often altogether unsurvevable 
wavs, but according to generally held opinion the average wages paid 
to farm hands before World War If  were 14 to 20 shillings. And with cruel 
purposefulness these wages were not raised because the planters were 
anxious to keep production costs on a low level, even if a raise would 
have been justified as a  result of increasing productivity . The above-cited 
Sir Percy Girouard said th a t a raise of wages would decrease and not 
increase manpower supply, because in case of higher wages the hut-tax 
or capitation tax of clans or tribes could be earned by fewer workers 
outside the village.**
Land robbery and the closely connected taxation were not enough 
to satisfy the needs of the colonizers. Beginning a t the partial consolida­
tion of their rule, up to their dislodgemcnt, they made use of forced la­
bour in the strict sense of t he tern).
Immediately after World War JI, 50 000 square kilometres of par­
tially barren and semi-arid land were shared by 6 million Africa)! pea­
sants, as opposed to the 00 000 Europeans who were in possession of 
10 700 square kilometres of the excellent soil of White Highland.
Looking at the distribution of land after World War If, we sec 
striking differences: the per capita share of Africans was less than 1 hecta­
re. while the average landed property of the Europeans was 2 400 hectar­
es. The total territory owned by Europeans was held bv 3 500 farmers and 
GOO companies. Discontent and anger were increased by the fact that the 
deprivation of land was not stopped. Even in 1048 more than 1000 acres 
of land were confiscated. The conditions of subsistence were further de­
teriorated by forcing the Africans to produce for exports and prohibiting 
the production of maize, wheat, beans and potatoes.!- This situation 
differed from the preceding period where it was exactly the production 
for exports th a t the settlers monopolized. The explanation lies in the 
increasing influence of foreign trade monopolies which made efforts to 
squeeze out still more coffee and tea from the colony while disregarding 
completely the adverse consequences of onc-crop farming. But the de­
cisive share of the European minority persisted thoroughout even so. 
It is illustrative of this situation tha t the production of coffee — the 
country's principal export article — depended decisively on the European 
plantations even it) the late fifties (1958 —59):they produced 19250 tons 
o f ih e  total annual outp))t of 22 500 tons.
By 1900 the wage labourcs in Kenya amounted to 301 000 m en." 
This is a rather high percentage, hut its true significance can be illust­
rated it) the knowlcdgcof the special circumstances which, by the way. 
arc similar nearly alt over the continent.
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Mention must be ma.dc of several inhibiting factors in Trans-Saharan 
Africa: almost 90% of the workers arc migrant workers^ part of whom 
work oniv unfit they cam the am ount of the levied taxes; only a  smati 
proportion (23%) is working in industries; owing to the industria) s tru ­
cture, no largcfactory proletariat exists; there is a ctose rctationship 
with the tribe, the village; the degree of organization is tow.
These factors arc to a certain degree counterbatanccd by the per­
manent influx to towns. For example, in 1901 the number of inhabitants 
grew by 70 000 in Nairobi. Nor must the fact be neglected th a t the 
migrant, workers had a disruptive effect with their mere presence on 
K enya's traditional social units, and became the carriers of new ideas 
(¡nasi without being aware of it. The proportion of permanent settling 
in big towns grew, although this is valid in a general sense only: 48 p.c. 
of the workers in Nairobi. 40 p.c. in Mombasa, do not stay with the same 
employer more than one year. In 1937 the African urban labourers 
revived 82 s. a month (plus 21 s. housing allowances) in Mombasa; 83 s. 
a month (plus 22 s. housing allowances) in N a iro b i .T h e  high rate of 
unemployment (affecting one tbird of the workers) helped keeping the 
wages on the lowest level, but towns and industries were attractive 
nevertheless, partly because this was the only sphere with open jobs, 
partly because the wages were relatively higher here. The term  "relativ- 
elv" appears clearly from these data: Africans employed in industries 
were paid 5.37 per cent of the wages for white workers, and 2.95 p.c. of 
the latter wages in agriculture.^
To give a proper definition of the class structure of the African po­
pulation after World War I I  is difficult. The traditional leading stratum  
had lost its importance. The British adm inistration realizing the policy 
of "indirect rule", and employing also Africans, may be left out of con­
sideration here in view of the fact that only a minor proportion of the 
traditional leaders was incorporated and only the lowest positions were 
filled with them (location chiefs, tax  collectors, etc.).
The bourgeoisie and intelligentsia of African stock was small in 
number and weak.
The majority of the lower middle class and of the middle class was 
formed by the Asian and Arab immigrants, and their class relations were 
made con ¡plicated by their lingual, religious and cultural foreignness. 
Thus their alliance with the African forces of independence was not a firm 
one throughout, and in many cases the function of this alliance was only 
to extort for themselves more privileges from the Kenya government.
The actual ruling class altogether consisted of foreigners. This is 
not to sav, of course, tha t all Furopcan immigrants belonged to the ruling 
class — the difference between owners of big estates and 20t)-hcctarc 
farmers was obvious — but even a white foreman or farmer who lived in 
relatively poor circumstances regarded the Africans as his chief enemy, 
onsidering tha t — with good reason by the way — his better living con- 
'itions rest on work screwed out of the Africans.
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The population of African stock was essentially and on the whole in­
terested in attaining independence because the African bourgeoisie and 
"elite" had no say in K enya on account of the targe number of settlers. 
As Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania put it: "for them the other 
party  is colonial pow er."'' As concerns the period under survey, the opi­
nion ol -I. W oddis is acceptable: the development of classes among the 
Africans is still rudim entary, their interests arc common, being independ 
ence and unity whereby the principal characteristic is radicalism. 
The common interests based on the underdevelopment of classes con­
stituted the fundamental condition for the unified anti-imperialistic 
struggle, and this unity till the attainm ent of independence proved to be 
stronger in entire Trans-Saharan Africa than, say, tribal or religious d i­
visions.
Also the proletariat belonged to the people's united front. As follows 
from its aforesaid characteristics, it had a relationship, more organic 
than the European with the peasantry tha t accounted for 90 p.c. of the 
population. Colonial history-writing does not take into account the role 
of the working class, which is not surprising; but there are theoreticians 
of the national liberation movements who contrast the working class 
with the peasantry, and regard the la tter as the sole carrier of the struggle. 
According to F. Fanon ,,in colonial territories, the proletariat represents 
the most favoured s tra tu m ...  the proletariat can lose nothing in the 
capitalist countries. . . in  colonial countries the proletariat can lose 
everything. . . They form the bourgeois stratum  of the colonized 
peoples."'" We have mentioned the living conditions of the Kenvan 
proletariat (approximately 100 s. monthly wages, one third unemployed, 
racial discrimination by paying them 3.37% of the white workers' wages, 
ect.) and these facts do not support the ideas about a "favoured" s tra ­
tum. The tremendous fluctuation itself speaks against this allegation. 
We must ask why the workers do not stay in the towns if two thirds of 
the agricultural workers -  according to the data  of a respectable com­
mittee-" — do not earn even the living wages ? Also the struggles and 
achievements of the emerging Kenyan working class contradict Fanon's 
thesis. Yet it is acceptable that the basis of the Kenyan national libera­
tion movement was the peasantry^' . As Colleb, one participant of the 
liberation movement said it is the land question tha t produces all political 
frictions in Kenya.
Economic exploitation and discrimination were closely connected 
in this period with the deprivation of civic and political rights. Manage­
ment of the Kenya colony and protectorate did not change substantially 
after World War i l .  The adm inistration was headed by a governor with 
extremely wide powers who was appointed by the British government, 
file composition of the Council of Ministers, of the Executive Council 
and of the Legislative Council co-operating with the governor showed the 
complete outlawry of the African population clearly . Up to 1944, th< 
most im portant Legislative Council had not one African member, an 
there were only 4 appointed African members among the other 38
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1952. in accordance witti t h r  policy of division, t he Asians hold 5 member­
ships, the Arabs 2, i.c. the representation of the non Knropean minorities 
in the Legislative Council was in striking contradiction to the ethnic 
and correlated class distribution of the population. In 1962 there were 
only 66 706 Kuropeans among a population of 8 676 060: the number of 
Asians was 1 78 660, of Arabs 38 669.-'- The representation of the Africans 
was similar also on the lower level of government agencies, and we may 
add that also the Knropean courts, hotels, schools, restaurants, 
residential (juarters, theatres and movies contributed to rendering 
the Africans second-class citizens in every field. The reserves were not 
only of economic importance — for settling and forcing to work the 
Africans deprived of their lands — they also had a political meaning. 
This appears from the fact that scpcial "locations" were marked out for 
them also in towns.
Shockingly poor health and cultural conditions resulted from the 
69 years of the undisturbed "civilixatorv" process. In 1956, there were 
only 613 doctors and 583 nurses in the country, which means tha t some 
199 090 people had one doctor, and if we compare this situation with the 
afore mentioned striking class differences within the population — i.e. 
tha t the health provision of white settlers was of higher standards than 
in Kurope — it is easy to see why cholera, syphilis and tuberculosis de­
cimated the population unhindered. (8999 people died of these diseases 
every year). Only 18 p.c. of the Africans in the schooling age attended 
school, and even these for no more than two or three years.
The relations between the immigrant Knropean ruling class and the 
Africans became tense rapidly. Antagonism was undeniable and evident. 
What contacts, if any, could there develop between these two classes is 
illustrated — more realistically illustrated than by any lengthy discussion 
or statistics — by a Swahili practical grammar which saw its third edition 
in 1963. I t  is one of the last lessons, a dialogue, whose text represents 
the ultim ate aim of the curriculum:^'
JPwMMKZ f  =  rao.s/er, Arrropeoa/* "(2kxx% amrafay."
.1/9; C -  aroa, A /rr'roa/' "/food raorar'ay."
/?.' " H'/ro/ do yorr rroa/.?"
A/. " /  rroa/ o./oA os o /roa.se-.serroa/."
A. "Arc yorr/orarZror rcr'/Z; /Acs /fad  o/yoA?"
A/. "fer/oraZy, /  /o re  /oar/ doae r7."
A. "Ac/ arc .sec yoar rdea/r/y cord oad yoor rror/Aoo/'." /TZr rrroa 
/oads //car orer, /Zrc rao.s/er Zoo/.s o/ //era .7
A.* 'Wo/ ¿rod, yorr raoy /ry. Toar da/re.s.' Array Zrr /Zrc /eo o/ /roZ//ro.s/ 
.sra; ra  /Ac raoraray every doy, /Zrea Array dorra oad yrrr/ fa order ary 
cZo/Zrc.s."
.1/. "A/ rrdro/ /rare s/roZZ /  Array /Zrc cZo/Zrc.s, S'r'r?"
A* "A/ serea."
.1/. " /  /Zrra/: /Zrr'.s rror/: fs arrrcZr /o ray Zr/day."
A.* " H'cZZ, rr-c ore yoray /o ace. T/io/'.s oZZ /o r /Zrc raoraerr/. Z'ZZ yrre yorr 
raore ras/rrrr/roa.s /onrorrorr. Dorr'/ Ae Zo/e /carorrorr."
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Only very few people could become house-servants doing work 
"much to their liking". The African population of Kenya had got into 
disastrous circumstances. The British colonial rule for which they had 
shed their blood in the war, endangered their mere subsistence, despised 
their self-respect. The conclusion of P. Bowles is no overstatem ent: 
"One cannot help but think that it is better to live in Kenya as a wild 
beast than as a human being.
The union ol forces lighting lor independence
Following World War l i ,  the pauperization trend of the entire Afri­
can population increased in Kenya. All negative, destructive features of 
the colonial status were manifest increasingly, more intensclv than ever 
before, while there was practically no sign a t all of the much- 
asserted civilizatorv mission, in  a new international situation which 
turned increasingly disadvantageous for imperialism, the country's 
economic progress, the emergence of a native bourgeoisie, intelligentsia 
and proletariat, made possible the unfolding of an extremely radical 
national 1 ¡Iteration movement standing in the front of the struggles for 
indcpendcnce on this continent. This phase of the movement was an 
outstanding and remarkable event of world wide significance, because 
it was successful and attracted  attention in a historical period fluring 
which the unrestricted influence of foreign powers still seemed unshakable 
in Trans-Saharan Africa. The more elastic British colonial policy, which 
registered considerable successes in the "masterly" solution of the de­
colonization process, appeared in its bare nature in K enya and showed 
not much dissimilarity front the brutal French or Portuguese methods 
which were often condemned by the liberal British press.
When an attem pt is made at objectivity in judging the struggles 
of this period, we deem it unnecessary to quote the pertinent conclusions 
of publicists and historians serving the interests of colonialism. These do 
not go beyond the slanders of Bishop Walter Carey's notorious work 
(Crisis in Kenya) and his biassed altitude concerning "secret terrorist 
organization" for the extermination of the Kuropcans whose causative 
factors must allegedly be sought in the racial hatred of the Negroes 
(Henderson and Ph. Goodhart: Mau Hunt in Kenya, New York, 11)38), 
in "ton much" civilization for the Africans (G. Shephard: They Wait in 
Darnkness, Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Hau .Man. 
London, ИМИ)), or in the prohibition of certain pagan dances bv missiona­
ries. (Lyttelton, Secretary of S tate for the Colonies).-" At the same time 
we must take issue also with tendencies of bourgeois historians which 
adm it the rightfulness of the struggle of oppressed peoples, but try  to 
present the Kenyan fight for liberation in most cases as the struggle of 
certain tribes against white settlers. This they do on the basis of the mosi 
conspicuous superficial symptoms, forgetting about the universal ant 
imperialistic essential nature of these movements which followed fro 
the above-outlined economic and social structure. To assert myths ahr
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the Colonial Office, which tried to keep the balance between the Kikuyus 
and the set tiers, was aiso in vogue. (Kvett the progressive minded C. Le- 
gutn regards tiie cotttradictioti between them as the priticipa! characte­
ristic of tiie period under survey.)-'
After World War 11, the priticipa) ¡tcculiaritv of poiiticai iife in K enya 
was the fact th a t tiie so-called national organizations were born. The 
term "national" here differs from what would foiiow from tiie generaHy 
acccptod concept oi a nation as based mainly ott Lutopcan expet icme, 
what we call the national liberation movement in Trans-Saharan Africa 
is the common, anti-imperialistic movements of peoples and tribes living 
within borders marked out under the effect of various circumstances by 
the colonizers.
Safetv measures taken during the war created peace on the surface 
of political life. But to accomplish this, means were resorted to which in 
themselves bore witness to the existence of a vigorous and wide spread 
resistance. All kinds of political activity of the Africans were prohibi­
ted, and the leaders were exiled to Kapenguria.'-*The only organization 
perm itted to operate was the Kikuyu Provincial Association which sup­
ported the war efforts, atid which was headed by H arry Tlntktt who got 
increasingly isolated from his masses.
The new Governor of the country, Sir Philip Mitchell, in an effort 
to preserve the British and Kuropean settlers' positions, atid paying due 
regard to the power relations that were changing all over the world and 
inK ettya  alike, took a definite stand for the line of multi-racial partner­
ship. Fnsurittg to the government broad possibilities of balancing, the 
principle co p artn e rsh ip "  was equivalent to the preservation of Kuropcan 
he<'emonv. Itt Mitchell's proposals for the reorganization of government, 
tendencies for establishing sclft-govcrnmcnt can be detected. The role of 
the Fxecutive Council was amplified, and this was manifest in what was 
called the "Membership system". Namely the members of the Hxccutivc 
Council established departm ents for attending to their separated provinc­
es, and the outlines of ministries to be born ttnfolcd in these departm ents.
Mince the "Membership system" rested oti the "partnership" prin­
ciple, if produced a wide resistance by the settlers even if its enforcement 
was envisaged for the distant future. What the settlers considered as 
feasible was ottlv the introduction of a constitution of the Mouth Rhode­
sian type. Their suspicion was not dispelled by their information about 
the 'Governor's Mouth African orange plantations, nor by his statem ent 
ahotd White Highland: "We have made this our latul by right of achieve­
m ent."^
The reborn African ^roupin^s (Kikuyu Ucncral Union, Uuo t tn 
on) saw a step forward itt these proposals at that lime, and suppoitcd 
them. The Kcnva African Study Cttion, holding its second Annual Dele­
gates' Conference itt February 1946. concerned itself with the question 
f soil erosion atid the creation of an all-national organization.3" This 
'ganization adopted the name Kenya African 1 ttion (KAI ). Ihe 
1 -t¡cipants' activities were never restricted to the legal actions of the
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party. New groups, more miiitant anti eotiseious titan ever before, emerged 
and identified tiiemseives with the aims and methods of modern poiitieai 
.''ttuggies, itut tried to eonnect titettt wit it traditional prohienisand forms. 
Jn this way the Kenvit mttionai movement — u n iik e in m o steo u n trie s  
of the eontinent -  was never iimited to the aetivilics of a reiativeiv nar­
row intoiicetuaieireie which is aide to ereate a imsis for itseif but tempo-
rariiy. Tite im[tort:mee of intclicctuais was eottsitierabie in Kenva as a 
tnattcr of course, !mt in ad (iition toA !a ttiu , Cicituru, Oinuiga, Awori, 
O ttendeam ) (hiede, wiio were ¡Letivein intcHectua! careers, w etttav  
tticntion on tite sttme footing former soidiers wito iteeatne icaders, sueit 
as Kuitai. Kaggia. \!ugo. Kitnatiti ;tn<i ^ietitengeA' The neatly ten thous- 
¡tttti tnetttiters of tite ilritish Kettytt. army.whieit were (iisehargeti after
t h e w a r .  re presen ted a very im[<ortattt force beettuse the i r  nt;t,jori?vstavc(i
tn towtts (Aiomitasa. Nttiroiti) attti fortneti tite tnost ttgiie anti seif-eouseiotts 
ptrrt of the emergittg [troictariat. Tltis is understandable because this 
stratum  acquired quaiifications in tite army which were rare among 
Afticatis, attti tite ititeiieetutti horizon of these pcopie was widened at tite 
same time, i he tact that tite number of workers grew eonsidcrabiv during
the  wat was a  firm s uppor t  for this  stratum.'** Peopie ordered to work on
communai ¡trojeets. and tite migrant workers fleeing from narrow reserves 
for shorter or ionger periods, made up half of the count ry's maic ]ttt]tttia- 
tion, anti their flow, itteessatitiy varying in its composition, provided a 
permanent link wit it tite rural regions.
i ho govern ment  tried to make the  best of the  c i rcumstance  that  the
Miteheii proposats were tiii titen receiveti witit apprnvai ity the Africans.
and in A p r i i f i ) 4 7  the  d r t t f t eo n s t i t t t t i o n  i teming f i t e n a n t e  o f  (Iriffitit.
t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of* S t a t e  f o r t h c C o i o n i c s .  wt ts  t t ta t ie  [ t ui t i i c .  T i i i s t i r a f t
p t o \ i ( i o d t l t : t t i n t h c T c g i s i a t i v e C < ) u n c i i a t t o n < ) f f i c i ; d ) n a j o r i t v t u t t s t b c
created, and contaimvi tite p r in c ijt ic ttf lh c  "Huropcan ¡tarity" (tite 
nutniter of European settier re])resetitatives ntust lte eqttal to tite total
uum i )C )n f t t i c ) cp r c scn t t t t i v c so fa ] ] o H io rc t ) t n i cc o m n ) u n i t i c s ) .* T f i t c r t t ] c
of the i-atropetm minority wtts guttrttttteeti in this wttv, witieit a]<pe:trs ttiso 
frotn tite tite remarks of ( 1. Bettnett Otat tiiere was "eonstttttt soeiai eon- 
taet itetweett offieia) ttttd settler.
^ c t t ) i c t r p [ ) o i n t m e t ) t < t f f o t t r A f r i c < t t t s t o t h c B c g i s ] < t t i \ c ( ' o u t t c i i i n  
1) 4 7  <ii(i no longer sat isfy th e  d e tn a t id s c i i t i t f t t i a t j o n a i  movement .  tt,ttd
s i t a m  e o n s e e e i o n s  w e r e  o f  n o  av t t i i  a t  a  t i n t e  w i t e t t  t i t e  }toi i t ie; t i  c o n s c i o u s ­
n e s s  o f  i t r o tn i  s t r a t a  g r e w  ttt a n  i t t c r c a s i n g  r a t e ,  ( i o v e r t t o r  Mi t e ] , e i l  
m a t i c  a n t i s t t t k e  i o a t i f i i f i n t t t h c w t t n t c d t o r c i d i x e l t t c f n m j t r o m i s c n n t  
w i t i t  t i t e  t t t f t s t r e s ) t e c t t t ) t i e i e < t < i e r s ( t f  t i t e  m t t i o n t t i  m o \ ( m t e n <  i n w t i o n i  
t e a t  [ t o w e r  w a s  v e s t e t i .  f*[t<ttt i t is r e t u r n  itt 19 4b ,  . I t t n u t K c n v t t t t a w a s  
w e i e o m e t i  tts t i t e  t n t t i i s p t t t a i t i e  i e a d e r  o f  a t ) .  A f r i c a n  [ a t i i t i e a i  g r t t t q t s  b e -
cattsc his scientific activi ties,  particuit trly ids mie in the  Ytit Pan-African
(ongress, h:t(igainc(i ttttiverstti tt]t]<reeitttiott. As the icttding figure o'
iat t-Africatiisttt ,  ite was free f r t t n t t t n y s t t s j t i c io n t t f i t e i t i g  tite ]tr<ttect<
S(tie)\ of K ikuytt intetesfs. Btt< evett so. ite offereti itis [tttrficijtation itt t ' 
Legisiative Cotttteii itt vaitt in eariy 1 9 4 7 , fteeause ^fiteiieii (ieeided t '
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Die Local Native Council, a body of restricted ioea! importance, would 
be t)ie pro])cr ]<ubiic fieid for tiim. But K envatta instead founded the 
Kenya Teachers' Training College in Githunguri, and this became the 
centre of African opposition. And from June on he increased his activities 
as the new president of the K enya African Union.
The training college of Githunguri attracted  like a magnet all young 
people eager to learn and growing conscious, and the independent schools 
successfully undertook a surprisingly rapid, centrally directed enlighten­
ment work and mobilization of the masses. The training of teachers was 
equivalent to the training of novel-type national cadres, and the operati­
ons of the teachers' network actually played the part of a political party. 
It is not by chance tha t the first vehement clashes were closely connected 
with the K enya Teachers' Training College.
In 1947 the workers of the Uplands Bacon Factory went on strike. 
The reason was that the management was not willing to dismiss a clerk 
who refused to contribute to the College fund. The police was called out, 
killed 3 strikers, and imprisoned the leaders. A part of the organizers 
were activelv involved in the 1946 strikes oi Mombasa, with Chegc 
K ibachia among them, who is the founder of the m ilitant trade 
union, the African Workers' Federation. The strike movement of the 
workers spread all over the country; the workers in military establish­
ments the Kisumu railwavmen, and over fifty thousand Mombasa long­
shoremen stopped working. The existence of constant town-village 
contacts appears from the circumstance th a t the masses working on 
big plantations joined them .^
Also the degree of organization, the awakening to political conscious­
ness of the demobilized soldiers grew. Although they are referred to as 
hooligans and robbers iti the contemporary press of the settlers, their 
clear cut political activity disproves this term. I t  was in September 1947 
that the name of their organization — which had probably existed since 
the end of the war — became known: Kiama Kia Ndcmwa Ithatu , which 
means the Party  of the Three Initials. These three initials refer to the 
suppressed KCA, the Kikuyu Central Association.3"
The resistance flaring up in the peasant regions was still closely 
tied to the traditional forms, and in the riots of the Kikuyu reserves a t 
the end of the year the again active Messianistic sects played an im portant 
role. The members of the Dini ya-Iesu Kristo sect — which had grown out 
of the Watu wa Mungu sect founded and consolidated in the 30's in 
opposition to the established Church of Scotland — fought for the restora­
tion of pre-colonial, "idyllic" conditions, revived deliberately ancient 
forms, donned animal skins, wore bows and arrows, and insisted on cer­
tain rites (some writers see a correlation between the old religious t r a ­
ditions of a sharp anti-British content and the title of Jomo K enyatta 's 
well-known book — Facing Mount Kenya — because the members ot 
his sect offered their prayers prostrating themselves before mount 
lcnva).3* On account of the striking similarity of these formal elements, 
e assumption that the direct popular roots of the Mau Mau must be
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sou^tit ttcrc seems to he correct. The December incident at Fort Hat! had 
severat victims.
! tms b \ ttte end of lif4t it broad aHiancc Ittul come into being wltitlt 
com[<rise(t (tiff'erent strata  and peoples of the Kenyan Africans, ant) which 
united the s])ontancous, instinctive and often primitive actions of the 
masses wit It the purposeful aspirations of highly imaginative, [trofessionat 
revottttionists.
The government. tutving to face a tiniverstt) resistttnee on the part of 
the Afticans wtiictt extended to at] sociatty ¡ntjtorttttif groups ranging front 
t)te peasants of ttic reserves to the nascent intettigentsia, had no choice 
ttut to t:thc the road towards the reatization of ttte])roctaimcd"pit.rttter- 
st)i]t potity. [)te [towers of ttte Legistativc ('ouncit were extetutcft. ]tt 
order to separate ttte emerging upper stratum  of the African ]topttt:ttiott. 
ftte foundatiott of a ntulti-racitd Utiitctt Kenya ('tub was envisaged. A bit] 
was entered for taking the particutars on a uniform principtc of alt citizens. 
According to t t i i s b i l t .  ttteau ttto ritics  wottk) tmvc tttken fingerprints 
(ki[t:tttde) for registration, 'ftte fututtuttcntitl ittt]tort;tnce o ffh is 'w tts  oft- 
vious: so far ki]tandc was onty a]t]ttie(t to ttte Africans, ittiterate in tticir 
majfttity, hence the extension of tttis measure was directed against raeiat 
discrimination, and. indircctty, agtdnst the hegemony of ttte Huropean 
mitiority.
Kiptutde was ttn:t.cce[)t:t.t'[e for ttte settters, its [troctattmtion [tro- 
(tttced a new wttve of resistance in their circtes. Dnttcr ttte stogati of pro­
tection of civic rights they created ttte Society of Civit Liberties, and 
stigmatized ttte bitl as the manifestation of totatitarianism. its  reject iott 
in the Legistativc ('ouncit (February ff)30) was a ttttd fittsco of* the "p a rt­
nership" principte: it was turned down by the setttcr representatives atnt
ttte officitttty :n)})oititct! civil servttttts together. '^  l't<c ]tl;dform o f  th c
hteclors t ain't —the ot)ty]'ttrty< 'f the Luro[)o;tttntinoritv at t)t:tttitnc 
m a i t e  pttbtic in Se])tcmber H)4f) <ti(] nttt su[t)tort ^titettett's "[tartner- 
sttip potiev. Att)toug)t tttey gave up the idea of sett government — owing
to the changed interna) power rotations, this demand was advantageous
for the poputation of African stock in ttte tong run — ttte federative 
plan was reborn. The demand for the "creation o f th e  new' British Hast 
Af'ican dominion under Luropcan leadership presupposed the incorpora- 
tio tto f  'Tanganyika amt a ctosc eo-otteration with Dm South Africtut 
UttiottA"
Ttte unity oif the African [toputatioti.comptcte by ttt(t end of 1 !)47, 
now was also dirttetettagttinst the principle of the "[tttrttttsrshi]) [totiev.
't he nationat movettient tttu] ntt tottger a. stake in acce[ttittg tttt- concept 
of ttte "racial communities" with ctjualrig ttts. A sK c n y a tta j tu t K in  
early 1!)48, K c n y a w o u h tb c a  }t:tr;utisciftho [atrttjteans went tt:tck 
wtiere tlicy ctttne front."'" A new strike wave rose itt Aiotttltasa itt mitt 1 t)4f), 
attd ttte actions ot ttte workers were by ntt tneatts restricted to demands 
of economic n:tt ttred' 1 ntprisonntettt of K iltacttitt, t tie teat ter o ft tte strikes 
<tid not set back ftte workttrs ntovement. The Africtut Workers' Fcttcrr 
tiott wtts (tissotvetf, bu t wtts ittitttettiatety re[)taced tty ttte ttetter organiz<
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"H ast African Trade Union Côtières." This new trade union federation 
represented ttie country's so far most progressive iedeas, unified as an 
organization the African and Indian workers, and established ctose con­
tacts with the organizations of the two other Mast Afican countries. Apart 
from the president Fred Kubai. the communist secretary générai Makhan 
Singh had a considerabie influence here.
The assemblv of the settlers convoked to Nairobi in Aprit 1950 was 
prompted — last but not least — by the growing trade union movement 
to see the way out in urgent assistance from North and South Rhodesia 
and from the South African Union.
The labour movement maintained efficient and close contacts, also 
in respect of the leaders, with other organizations of the national move­
ment. Another highly im portant fact was tha t the non-worker s tra ta  of 
the Indian population — forming the majority and having greater au thor­
ity — established closer relations with the Africans. In spring 1050 the 
K enva African Union held a joint meeting of protest with the Feast 
African Indian National Congress. The attendants of the meeting gave 
a vote of non-confidence in respect of European leadership.'' The au tho­
rities arrested Makhan Singh and Kubai immediately after the meeting, 
and accused them of illegal organizing activity. These arrests led to a ge­
neral political strike in Nairobi!''
The governor did his best to put an end to the more and more evident 
fermentation. A decree on the banning of the Man Mau was issued in 
August. Insistence on the principle of multiracialism — which in the 
given circumstances was the last peaceful way for the leaders of the British 
colonial policy — did not make possible the liquidation of all African 
organizations. The various organs of interest protect ion. resting on ethnic 
or regional foundations (e.g. the Merchants' and Growers' Association 
of the Kikuyu), K cnyatta 's independent schools, and even the Kenya 
African Union, continued to operate. The November assembly of the K AU 
was marked by a spirit of further radicalization, the moderate leaders 
were outvoted. Although Griffith spoke in the House of Commons about 
a constitution for the Hast African colonics and their constitutional deve­
lopment within the Commonwealth!' there was no indication tha t all 
this would be realized in the foreseeable future. For the Africans multi- 
racialism, was out of the question as an ultim ate solution. Governor 
i\litchell's statem ent, which came into the open in some way, according 
to which the so-called learned Africans have not more attainm ents than 
European children at the age of 1 2 !" whereby their participation in politic­
al leadership is not feasible, shocked the Africans and raised their suspi­
cion. The extremist manifestations of the settlers' [tress, (they didnot 
decline to the position of "a protected minority")'" not rejected expli 
citlv bv the government further increased the tension.
Griffith's visit to the country in May. his meetings with K cnyattn 
and Koinange, failed to produce the expected result. The Secretary's 
promises would not have satisfied the national movement even if they 
had been fulfilled. The peasants confined to the reserves, or working a t
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Euro])ean f'aiins for starvation-wages, resorted to the means of individual 
retaliation more and more often. Mitchell's departure in June 1932 could 
solve tiothing. The organized forces of t tic nationai movement threatened 
the British ru)c in Kenya with complete coHapse. Ttie newly appointed 
governor, Sir Evelin Baring, arrived with a considerable number of 
British troops. On October 20, the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
approved the decree on the proclamation of a state of emergency.
Development and defeat of the revolutionary fight for freedom
An armed movement had become nation-wide by the end of 1932. 
In the beginning the leaders of the colony denied even its existence, but 
iater, when it was no longer possible to hush it up. they tried to wipe it 
out by fire and sword, employing all tools of a colonial war while shower­
ing on it a m ultitude of accusations and slanders. 1 ¡(setting articles,studi­
es and books were published on the torturing and extirpation of European 
farmer families, on barbarous customs, oaths of ghastly wording. Yet all 
this cannot affect our judgment about the rightfulness of this struggle, 
knowing the social tensions practically inconceivable in Europe, the hope­
less destitution, the ravaging diseases, endless humiliations, and the ignor­
ance, despair and primitive customs still existing after 30 years of coionial 
rule. The anti-imperialist struggle was doubtless rightful and just, and 
acted in the direction of social progress against the foreign ¡tower that 
hindered development.
The coming into being of the Mau Man movement'* is explained hy 
Josiah Kariuki. a close collaborator of K enyatta, like this:
"After the 1939 — 43 War things were changing. Our social and eco­
nomic grievances were ¡'laincr to all and there were tnany more educated 
Africans who were beginning to understand that the social system was 
not immutable. Thousands more had recently returned front service in 
t he K ing's African Hi lies all over t he world. The grant ing of 1 ndcpendencc 
to India and Pakistan, the developing struggle in Ghana, and the increas­
ed publicity given to such things in newspapers and radio programmes, 
all contributed to the steady growth of political sensibility among the 
Africans in Kenya. Most of all was this happening among mv own tribe, 
the Kikuyu.
1 hey had long been in the van of Kenya politics; they were living in 
ovcrfrow dcdandundovctopcd Reserves, in many ¡daces with a density 
of well over a t honsand to the square mile: they felt dec)) grievances over 
the land which had been taken from them, land without which they could 
have no religious or social security. When the Europeans first came to the 
country the Kikuvu fought under Waivaki H in g a to  preserve their 
lands."
He writes of the well-known process of land robbery and then con­
tinues:
"At the same time they were suffering <hc humiliations of the colour 
bar. Many Europeans relused to talk to educated Africans in any km-
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gunge hut tticii' dc)Jorably bad Swahili: old men were addressed as hoys 
and monkevs; Africans were barred from hotels and clubs; Africans with 
tan<l near Kuropean farms were not allowed to ]'lant coffee; there was 
a wholesale disregard for human dignity and little respect for anyone 
with a hlac-k skin."^
tn  fact Man flan was nothing else hut the continuation in the armed 
wav, the culmination of the Kenya national liberation movement. It was 
one of the world's most important manifestations of forces fighting 
against colonisation.
The state of emergency proclaimed on October 20, 1032, made possible 
the exile of suspected persons, the prohibition of public meetings, to 
impose curfew, and a number of similar security measures. The arrest 
of the members of the K enya African Union was started some hours 
after the [¡reclamation of the state of emergency, and some hundred 
leaders, with K enyatta and Oncko among them, were sent into exile at 
once.
The Man Man trial, lasting hundred days, was opened in early J a ­
nuary 1033. The authorities were able to sentence the arrested leadersof 
the K AU only through false evidence for the Crown.'" K cnvatta, and each 
of his five followers, were sentenced to 7 years of forced labour. The 
[¡arty itself was suppressed on January  8.
As happens invariably in the case of a true popular insurrection, 
these terroristic measures only fanned up the flames, and from early 
11)33 the armed resistance began to assume mass dimensions. Hv mid- 
Februarv an army of tw enty thousand, and a seven-thousand strong 
irregular "security formation", took up the fight against the insurgents.^" 
In March the Secretary for the Colonies analyzed the situation in Kenya 
in the House of Commons, saying that it resembles a war rather than a 
state of emergency A' The contemporary [tress was full of gruesome re­
ports; figures were published about killed Africans, punitive expeditions, 
luuned-down villages, mass Itanishtncnts, overcrowded concentration 
camps. 7(M)0 people were carried off during one "opration" in Nairobi. 
Measures taken for the deportation of tens of thousands involved con 
fisc-ation of property, horrible acts of cruelty became daily routine. Yield­
ing to the demand of the settlers, the British government sent general 
Tumplcr. the mass murderer of Malaya, to Kenya to "restore order".3-
The guerilla movement grew into an all-national liberation struggle, 
several revolutionary centres, bases were formed, the most important one 
being in the Aberdare Range. The number of participants in the uprise 
grew rapidly: according to British data, about three hundred thousand 
insurgents were active in May, and one million were reported in Ju ly  
(In the period under survey, the population of K enya was less than eight 
million.) Although nearly 9(1 per cent of the participants came from the 
related Kikuyu. Kmhu and .Moru peoples, the "Onego Society" of the Luo, 
anil revolutionarv groups of other tribes also joined in the fight. At the 
same time the British succeeded in making best of the tribal differences, 
and most of the Masai, for example, were involved in defeating the uprise.
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A united direction of the insurrection demanded considerable efforts. 
By the end of 1053 it was possible to unify Hie guerilla detachments, 
and this was the birth of the "African Army of Liberation". The organized 
guerilla warfare considerably helped the participants in becoming self- 
conscious, and it is a remarkable fact that the essentials of scientific 
socialism found their way also to this backward African country. The 
tremendous tasks produced outstanding military leaders, among whom 
Dcdan Kimathi and Waruhiu Ito te  were the most prominent. The pseu­
donym used by K im athi was "General Russia", th a t of Waruhiu was 
"General China". The saying with which K im athi characterized the 
Man .Mau is typical of his views: The Man Mau — t his is the poor of Kenya 
and nothing more. And you cannot cure the poor with bombs and othcr 
wcapons.s3
The government made tremendous efforts, and was not evei-scrupu­
lous in finding the ways: they opened fire on the persons invited for peace 
talks, launched destructive air-raids against the bases in the Aberdarc 
Range, drew a "hunger-zone" round them, united all Heast African 
Brit ish military forces in May 1353: a new draft constitution was prepared 
(the Executive Council was turned into the Council of Ministers), general 
pardon was proclaimed for dividing the fighters — but all this had little 
success.^ By mid-1955 an army of 35 thousand men was deployed to the 
Aberdarc Range alone, and "300 — 400 fighters were killed every month" 
according to reports. In early 1956 there were about seventy thousand 
people in concentration camps, with 14 000 women and 2000 children 
among them.
In summer 1956 the superior forces dealt a decisive blow on the 
insurgents in the Aberdarc Range; deprived of their reserves, the exhaust­
ed. lessening troops were no longer able to hold their own. The opportu­
nistic policy of Tom Mboya and his group, which relied exactly on thc 
concessions enforced by the victorious struggles, detached the qualified 
workers from the uprising, and the nascent African middle class longed 
lor more peaceful means. The Man Man movement was not aide to unite 
all African tribes, and treated all Kuropcaus as enemies. The Asians and 
Arabs were passive at best and, fearing a preponderance of Africans who 
made up the country's majority, made approaches to the government. 
The socialist canqi was not able to exert decisive influence on the outcome 
of the liberation struggles in Trans-Saharan Africa. The efforts of the 
British Communist Barty — formation of what was called the Kenya 
Committee, organization of protesting campaigns, collection of signatures 
— were not able to reverse Brit ish policy.^
But whatever difficulties there existed, it was not possible to crush 
once for all the national liberation movement in Kenya. One of the chief 
reasons is the lact that the Alan Alan — despite its limitations — was 
expressing the interests of the entire African population, was the organic 
continuer of the independence aspirations datingback  to 1952. We must 
emphasize this fact, for there is a well-known opinion according to which 
the Mau .Mau in fact inhibited constituional development. The circum-
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stance tha t Jonio K enyatta  and his collaborators detached themselves 
from the movement in the course of their trials, whe the British autho­
rities produced a fatse witness for sentencing them, contributed to  the 
s)treading of this view. The detachment was iegaliv true; K cnyatta and 
his group coutd not have been held responsibic for the preparation of tin: 
Alau Man because this was a spontaneous movement. Nevertheless, tint 
Kenya African Union and the Atau Man in fact grew up from the same 
social and political soil. This is ex pressed in a popular song about Ki 
mathi (Rwimborwa Kimathi) th a t according to the chronicler ,,was com­
posed in the forests and is very well known in our country."5" K im athi 
and K cnyatta are mentioned together, in  the first verse we read:
"W h u n  o u r  K im a th i  a scen d ed  
In to  t iie  m o u n ta in s  a ione  
H e  a sk e d  fo r s t r e n g th  a n d  co u rag e  
T o d e fea t th e  W h ite  M en"
And the sixth verse runs like this:
" E v e n  w hen  o u r  h e a r ts  a re  tro u b te d  
.)om o will n e v e r d e se rt  u s .  . . "
And Oginga Odinga, one of the K enya African Union's most radical 
leaders, said this: " i t  is our duty  to express our gratitude to our brethren 
who have prepared and carried out the Mau Alan uprise."-"
The armed uprise, which was the successor of the former liberation 
movement in another form, survived after its defeat for a while not only 
in the scattered guerilla groups, but also in the entire anticolonialist 
struggle which could never be annihilated. Its  defeat was not a fall, it 
was a station. The Kenya White Alan's Country legend vanished once for 
all. ft has become an unambiguous fact tha t the country's principal 
force is the African population. British policy, appearing more elastic 
by now, rcalixcd this gradually and started its decolonisation endeavours 
also in this territory . f t  was intended to give an ever increasing role to 
the "loyal" African politicians, paying less attention to the European 
minority. The chief lesson of the armed fight was summed up by Odinga: 
"Were it not for the heroism of the Alan Alau fighters. Kenya now would 
certainlv be a second South Africa."^
The armed insurrection accelerated the pace of political develop­
ment: the demand for independence was formulated among the Africans 
emphatically.
Within 24 hours after the proclamation of the state  of emergency, 
the most im portant leaders of the national movement, were arrested. 
In such circumstances the Africans rejected the "partnership" policy 
radically, opposing the majority principle to it. Secretary of S tate for the 
Colonies Lyttelton went to Kenya in Alarch 1954, and promised the intro­
duction of a new constitution, which was soon realised. Its  evident pur­
pose was the winning over of the African petty  bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, 
and the chicfsof minor tribes, and their separation from the supporters
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of the armed uprise. But the number of loyal Africans was smaii. After 
thc banning of t!te Kenya African Union (in duty 1933), a new organiza­
tion, the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions was formed in 
October 1933. i t  was headed by Tom Albova, raised moderate demands, 
and its mass influence was insignificant, extending only to the urban 
skilled workers. But the principle of Muropean parity, figuring in the con­
stitution and stating a 3 : 2 : 1 ratio of the Furopean, Asian and Africa 
communities, was not acceptable even to Albova and his group.
it was at this time th a t the signs of a polarization appeared in the 
circles of the Furopcan minority for the first time. Its most far-sighted 
representatives — although an insignificant minority believed tha t 
their acquired positions could be maintained by a cooperation with part 
of the Africans. In -June 1934 Blundell founded the United Country 
Party  based on the "multiracial" principled" Yet even the official colonial 
policy itself was instrum ental in isolating Blundell: the ruthless actions 
against the national movement in Kenya doubtlessly made the impression 
on the Furopeans tha t the country's colonial status was not to be put in 
issue within reasonable time. This was indicated by the visit to Nairobi 
(October 1934) of Lennox-Boyd, after his appointment as Lyttelton 's 
successor, in the course of which he assured the Furopeans of the British 
government's support, and expressed his hopes for further large-scale 
immigrations."" The Coutts Report — published in January  — studiing 
the suffrage problems of Lyttelton constitution stated the participation 
in the elections "is not a right, but a privilege". Such participation was 
envisaged on the basis of repaired age, schooling, responsible position, 
and. in the case of people of Kikuyu, Fmbu and Aleru stock, production 
of a Loyalty Certificate to prove t rustwort Id ness.'''
The Afau Alan uprise doubtlessly formed the principal contents of 
the period between 1932 and 1936, and the constitutional development 
planned "independently" of it resulted in no substantial step forward.
Fenya attains independence
The armed fights ceased by the end of 1936. but the way to the ulti­
mate aim was not blocked before the national liberation movement of 
Kenya. Peaceful means came to the fore: parliam entary quarrels got live­
lier. talks, compromises came in (¡nick succession, political parties emerg­
ed, meetings, demonstrations were common occurrences.
The internal economic-social changes of Kenya alone cannot serve 
as a full explanation for understanding the historical period that began 
in 1937. There was a seeming rapprochement between London and the 
forces fighting for the independence of Kenya. On the one hand, a t the 
time of the Alau Alan uprise, the ruling circles held out the prospect of 
more concessions; the number of Africans on the Legislative Council was 
increased in 1932; a Council of Alinisters was set up in 1933: a new con­
stitution was put into force a year after, which envisaged a broadening 
of African representation: and. finally, a restricted franchise was granted
270  A. BA LO G H
to the Africans in 1937. On the other hand, the most radical elements of 
the uprise had been destroyed, and seeing the concessions, the adherents 
of the compromising solution felt that they were justified by the events. 
But the "rapprochem ent" of the two antagonistic parties was only super­
ficial. I t  would have been incomprehensible th a t British imperialism, just 
afte r a bloody victory, should have given up its positions, and that a co­
lonial war of more than four years should only have prepared an honour­
able withdrawal. In essence , the Ibices of the Kenya independence move­
ment survived after 193(1, but British imperialism had to face a radically 
changed international situation.
Namely by the mid-fifties the positions of the colonial powers had 
been weakened all over the world, and a historical period began to evolve 
in which the joint forces of the socialist camp and the national liberation 
movements were felt also in Africa.
The disintegration of the colonial system is of course not a conse­
quence of the victory of socialism; the former as well as the la tter has 
come about through a sharpening of the contradictions of imperialism, 
although socialism organized into a world-wide system has also affected 
the process of disintegration. Another most im portant factor is the soli­
darity of the newly liberated countries and national movements which 
represented an increasing force since the convocation of the Bandung 
Conference in April 1953. The fact that — to quote Nehru — "more 
than half the world population has entered the arena of international 
life""- has shaken entire Trans-Saharan Africa. The tempest of revolu­
tions ravaged nearer and nearer also in space, and billowing the Suez 
adventure which ended in a humiliating defeat of the British, the most 
developed Trans-Saharan British colony, the Cold Coast, attained its 
independence on March 6, 1957, and adopted the name Ghana which 
recalls the past before colonization.
The foundations and the reason for the independence to be attained 
consisted in K enya's above-presented economic, social and political con­
ditions, but the victory could only be gained in this favourably chang­
ed world situation, f t  was in this way tha t a situation arose in K enva in 
which the colonial rule was not stabilized after the defeat of the anti- 
imperialist armed struggle, and tha t from 1957 this struggle gathered 
new momentum which it was no longer possible to hold up.
In March 1957, the Africans only held 8 places of the 59 in the Legisla­
tive Council. These 8 representatives, aware of the increasing pressure 
by the masses, raised several demands in their talks with the Governor 
Baring. These demands went beyond their policy adopted till then. The 
unavoidable sweep of events was manifest in the fact tha t African leaders 
— members of the Legislative Council — who had been indifferent or 
hostile towards the Mau Man movement — such as Ngala, Muliro and 
Mboya — now demanded not only an equality of races — this was 
emphasized before, bu t was not too important in its general aspects — 
but also universal suffrage (in colonies where the decisive majority of the 
native population deliberately opposes foreign rule, this demand is much
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more im portant Item anywhere else), the lifting  of tta state of emergency, 
which was the precondition for unfoiding political struggles, confiscation 
of land not used by the European farmers, a system of equal representa­
tion, eight-form general schooling, and other progressive-minded measur­
es. in  a protest against the continued maintenance of the Lyttclton- 
constitution, the African representatives refused to accept ministerial 
posts. The British leading circles were anxious to solve the constitutional 
crisis as soon as possible, for fear of another upswing in mass movements. 
After long parley in London and then in Nairobi, the Lcnnox-Boyd con­
stitution was made public. This granted further six seats to Africans 
in the Legislative Council, bu t — even together with other concessions — 
this proved to be no longer enough. The November 13 declaration of the 
African leaders stated  th a t the new constitution is a tool for the consoli­
dation of the colonial rule and for maintaining the rule of the white se tt­
lers.^
The introduction of the new constitution in April 1038 was preceded 
by bloody meetings and deportations. The authorities prohibited the 
holding of public meetings, concent rated troops, banned the newly formed 
People's Party (Kiama kia Alwingi). and sent 83 of its members in exile. 
British imperialism tried once more to perpetuate its rule. Disregarding 
democratic procedural rules, legal proceedings were instituted against 
seven members of the Supreme Council (well known men among them 
were Odinga, Alhoya, Aluliro, Ngala). Yet the sentences passed in -June 
already expressed the new power relations, because the accused only were 
ordered to pay 73 $. British colonial policy gave up its original designs 
once for all, and the object in view now was to make the decolonization 
process as smooth as possible in order tha t British positions should be 
maintained as far as possible after the attainm ent of independence, in 
January  1 !)3tt. following the London conference of the Hast African 
colonial governors, an announcement was issued in which the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies consented to a round-table conference about a 
constituion for Kenya.
x * *
Thus it was evident by now tha t the colonial system was living on 
borrowed time also in Trans-Saharan Africa. A regrouping of forces be­
gan, all were anxious to keep or get the best possible posit ions for the 
time after the inevitable change.
Decomposition started also among the settlers. The New Kenya 
Party was formed in April which, theoretically, should have united all 
races of Kenya. Its obvious purpose was to divide tbc Africans, and to 
salvage the privileged position of the Europeans at the cost of concessions. 
The platform included the attainm ent of independence by stages, but the 
dead-line remained in obscurity. The leader, Blundell, said tha t ,,the 
British government must maintain responsibility until all races are p<! t- 
pared. . .  for accepting a parliamentary system suitable for Kenya 
It is a remarkable fact that while the African independence movenic* '
2 7 2  A. BA LO G H
was not able to decide how to pi t eed, Blundell and his group considered 
it necessary to propagate the capitalist way with full determ ination; 
they opposed the expropriation or collectivization of land, industries or 
trade."s They tried to make their principles accepted by saying th a t thev 
wanted to grant the right of buying land at White Highland also for 
Africans. As a consequence of the intensified class antagonism, the 
policy of co-operation with the Africans — Blundellism — was not able 
to secure an im portant base for itself on either side.
A considerable proportion of the ruling class of European stock 
opposed any kind of independence. I t  appeared tha t, in the last analysis, 
the British government had identified itself with the long-term Africa 
policy of the home monopoly-capitalist groups, l id s  policy — generally 
defined as the policy of neocolonialism — understood the necessity of 
liquidating the colonial system, but was not willing to sacrifice to a few 
thousand settlers the possibility of its future influence, its international 
prestige. The European minority got aware of this changed situation 
with despair. Their mood is expressed in a le tter written to the Times 
by Huxley and Perham in which they say tha t the British government 
had ever since 1903 lured the settlers to go to Kenya, th a t these settlers 
later produced 80% of the country's exports, and th a t now they are 
going to lose everything, but do not resort to violence: " it is fortunate 
for Britain and for the Africans in K enya tha t the Europeans there have 
neither the strength nor the inclination to express their feelings in this 
wav.""" Vet in August 1959 they utntcd forces in the racist United Party  
which was formed from the Progressive Local Government Par! v and 
the extreme right "ultras" of Briggs. They demanded in their programme 
continued control by the British government for a long time to come, and 
a segregated development of races.
After the lifting of the state  of emergency, the majority of the Euro­
peans supported "The Kenya Coalition". This party , founded in early 
I960, substantially adopted in a covert form the extreme right conception 
of the Briggs group. They wanted to unite all European groups. The 
leader of the party was Sir Ferdinand Cavandish-Bentinck. an owner of 
big estates.
The Asians with their special class background had established then- 
organizations long ago. Between the two world wars the K enya Indian 
Congress was actively fighting against the rule of the white settlers and 
against racial discrimination. Its  progressive character increased from 
1945: they began to co-operate with the Kenya African Union, but a t 
the time of the Man Mau movement, afraid of losing their positions, 
they intensified relations with the government. From 1959, when the 
large-scale polarization process was gaining strength, the members joined 
partly the "liberal" Blundellists, ¡tartly the Kenya National Party which 
was also "multiracial" but was under vH'rican control, i t  was the ¡tarty 
he middle class of African stock.
Part of the Asians, being aware of realities, took a stand for the ini­
tiate granting of independence, but were anxious to preserve their
ANKALES — Spclit' U is lo rira  — Tom . X IH .
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former special and isotated position also in the new African state. Headed 
hv Chanan Singh, the Kenya Freedom P arty  was formed in February 
i960. They considered th a t if they adm it the Asians, they, wiii piay a po­
sitive role in the new society of Fast Africa.""
The Africans created their national organization, the K enya African 
Union, as early as 1943, but under the pressure of persecution this party  
collapsed at the time of the insurrection. The first organization to emerge 
in 1930 was the Popular Convention Party  of the trade union leader 
Tom Albova, in 1939 the general radicalization and the favourable turn 
in the international situation made it possible to create a party which 
combined all s tra ta  and tendencies of the Africans (ranging from Albova 
to Odinga who had just returned from Peking). This was the K enya 
Independence Alovemcnt (K1 Al) which, after its merger with the aforesaid 
Kenya National Party, assumed its final form and was named the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU). A sheir of old Kikuyu organizations, 
it operated as the country's largest and most influential party. Although 
there were various elements in its ranks, it was — as a consequence of 
the general class conditions of the Africans — a revolutionary organiza­
tion which demanded the granting of independence immediately, and the 
solution of the land problem. Its  programme included the demand for 
stopping further Furopean immigrations, liquidation of racial discrimina­
tion, and the release of K enyatta.
The united trade union of the workers of Kenya, the Kenya Federa­
tion of Labour, which a t the time of the insurrection followed no clear- 
cut policy and concerned itself solely with economic problems, came into 
the limelight again. The workers of Nairobi played an im portant role on 
October 2(1, 1959, when, following a powerful mass demonstration, the 
six arrested leaders of the Kenya Independence Afovement were released. 
The November strike of the railwavmen had 20 000 participants, and was 
of a pronounced political nature, reflecting again a radical role of Albova 
in the KIAI. The rapid growth of self-consciousness appears from the fact 
that in Alarch I960 the construction workers of the military base of 
Kahawa demanded the liquidation of bases in the course of organized 
strike movements.
The British government began to employ the policy of "evasive 
actions" with the intention tha t independence should come from the go­
vernment, by preserving a number of privileges of course. The state of 
emergency, which had existed from October 2b, 1952, was ended on J a ­
nuary 12 , I960.
Not a week had passed since emergency was lifted, when on January  
IS, I960, another round-table conference was opened in London to dis­
cuss the constitutional problems of Kenya. The African representatives 
brought with them the mood of the radical and wello-rganized masses, 
voiced the slogan "one man — one vote", demanded responsible govern­
ment made up of Africans, immediate independence, democratic liberties 
such as freedom of speech and assembly, an agrarian reform, the release 
of K enyatta, and the liquidation of foreign bases. On the day when th
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conference was opened, they gave a statem ent to the press, in which as 
the representatives of the African population of Kenya, declared categoric- 
aiiv tha t their country was now ready to assume the responsibility in- 
voived in self-government.""
The British government had to make several concessions. Of the 
53 eiectcd members of the Legislative Council, only 10 were Europeans 
hv now, and at least four of the 12 members of the Council of Ministers 
had to be Africans; but the many promises to be fulfilled in the future, 
which kept silent about self-government, did not satisfy the African 
leaders of Kenya, and particularly not the masses. As a disgrace to the 
long colonial rule, the conditions of suffrage (age limit of 21 years, literacy, 
50 pounds sterling annual income) disfranchised 4 million and a  half of 
the 6 million voters. The right of the Governor to revise any decision 
continued to be in force. The delegation returning home in late February 
was received by a  crowd of 15 000 people in Nairobi, and a  protesting 
resolution was adopted.
The then prevailing mood is well expressed by the fact th a t in March 
1060 the exiled K envatta  was elected president of the newly formed 
K enya African National Union. The failure of the London conference 
led to a forging ahead of the leftist, radical elements.'*" The right wing 
led by Mbova was pushed back in 1961. The KANU Manifesto published 
in Cairo emphasized th a t "the principal aim of KANU as a national 
movement is the immediate attainm ent of independence. . . KANU holds 
tha t the imperialists never distribute independence from a silver tray ."  
The gaining ground of the left wing resulted in a progressive programme 
also for the period following victory: "A poorly developed country like 
ours has no choice but to go the way of a planned economy. .
The prevalence of the left wing in the KANU was an opportunity 
for the British government and the settlers to detach part of the Africans. 
The Kenya African Democratic Union was formed for this purpose in 
-July I960, mainly of the members of the preceding K enya National Party . 
Formally it presented itself as the protector of the small tribes, trying to 
set them against the Kikuyu and the Luo. TheK alenji, Masai and Somali 
gave up their former separate organizations (Kalendjin Political Alliance, 
Masai United Front, etc.), bu t the KADU's political character was in­
dicated mainly by the large number of rightist KANU dissenters. H ie 
party  headed by Muliro and then by Ngala was for federalism which in 
itself weakened the anti-imperialist forces. They wanted to get a federal 
constitution which recognizes the regional governments (majimbo). 
Their platform included the demand for raising living standards and for 
industrialization, the demand lor democratic liberties and eight-form 
schooling. They were clearly for the m ulti-party system. KADU wanted 
to distribute to the Africans only the uncultivated areas. This formulation 
of the land question — K enya's gravest problem — had also an exposing 
effect. At a later time KADU was given 25 OttO pounds sterling by the 
Europeans.*'
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Actual power relations were illustrated by the elections to the Le­
gislative Assembly in February 1961. The sweeping force of the liberation 
movement was manifest in the circumstance that the KANU scored 
467 000 votes, while the KADI*, backed by the government and the 
small tribes, got only 142 000.
Yet it was the representatives of the К A D I' that got members of 
the government because KANU withdrew until K envatta 's release. As 
a result of an immense mass support, this took place in July, and Kc- 
nvatta  took the chair of the party  in October.
The consitution of 1962 was intended for strengtheningthe supporters 
of federalism; according to obsrevers the situation in Kenya began to 
resemble tha t of the Congo, i.c. the forces of neocolonialism launched an 
increasing attack. And it was here th a t the role of rich fighting experience 
and of an organized party  was manifest: Kenya was able to avoid the 
fate of the Congo. The KANU was victorious in the elections of May 
1963, and Jomo K cnyatta was elected to the office of the first president 
of the state on June 1 . The new government immediately demanded a 
revision of the constitution and the evacuation of foreign troops. A reso­
lution was passed on the "building of a democratic, socialist Kenya" 
(true, every group interpreted this differently), and the programme of 
land redistribution was published. The uncertainty in respect of the 
further steps to be taken appears from the fact tha t they were not able 
to decide whether land should be in private or co-operative ownership. 
In the field of foreign policy, a stand was taken for establishing good 
relations with all countries, and a delegation was sent to the Soviet Union 
in November.
The date of attaining independence was made public after the Мал* 
elections. Kenya, which had fought one of Africa's most stubborn and 
desperate struggles against British imperialism which was particularly 
strong here, was among the last to a tta in  independence on December 12, 
1963. Long-dcsircd "uhuru" (freedom) was born at last.
After a colonial past of more than half a century, Kenya joined the 
ranks of independent countries with the heritage of all colonial burdens.
Hye-witnesses say tha t at the independence celebrations in Nairobi 
"the representatives of Britain behaved as if their country had prepared 
Kenya for independence from the beginning, and tried to give the im­
pression as if they were gladder of this independence than the people of 
Kenya itself."^
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